Introduction
For a long period the industrial policies of national governments in Europe aimed at reinforcing the position of leading firms in the country in order to face the rapidly growing competition from US and later from Japanese firms (Cox and Watson, 1995) .
The privileged position of these firms offered them substantial monopoly power within their markets, which, unfortunately, also often resulted in the use of many inefficient practices. Most governments sustained the privileged position of these national champions through the erection of various kinds of non-tariff trade and investment barriers directed against foreign competitors and creating strong borders protecting national markets.
The recognition that these policies failed and were partly responsible for slow growth, The present paper represents an original attempt to trace the changing industrial and geographical diversification strategy of firms along the integration process. The analysis is based on a unique database covering the product and geographical scope of the leading European firms in the manufacturing sectors for three years characterising different moments in the integration process, 1987 (start), 1993 (half-way) and 1997 (near completion) . Before analysing the data, the next part offers some theoretical perspectives about the consequences of the European market integration program for the international strategies and structures of European firms.
European market integration: the Single Market Program

The economic consequences
The process of European market integration involves primarily a reduction in trade and investment costs of doing business across borders of EU Member States, and a displacement of fragmented national markets by a single (EU) market. Market integration was triggered by the Single Market Program (SMP) in 1985, comprising a wide variety of measures to harmonise regulations and open up public procurement markets in the EU. The integration process has since then been systematically changing the nature of competition, and therefore the structure and performance of industries and firms. The "official EC" view (summarised in the Cecchini Report on the "Costs of Non-Europe") anticipates four main effects from the SMP, each having implications for the structure of industries and firms:
• direct cost savings due to the elimination of non-tariff barriers, such as fewer customs delays and costs of multiple certification;
• cost savings derived from increased volumes and more efficient location of production (scale and learning economies and better exploitation of comparative advantage);
• tightening of competitive pressures, reduced prices and increased efficiency as more firms from different member states compete directly in the bigger market place;
• increased competitive pressures generating speedier innovation.
Besides the direct effects, strong industry and firm restructuring effects are expected to follow from market integration. Unfortunately the research on the latter point is rather limited (Sleuwaegen, 1995) . From a macro-economic point of view, the most extensive evaluation of the SMP is that of the EC itself (1996) based on a large body of commissioned research, using mainly fairly aggregate EUROSTAT databases.
Following the results of a macro-economic model it was estimated that the level of EU GDP in 1994 was about 1.1% to 1.5% above the level that would have prevailed in the absence of the single market program.
The impact of the SMP on industrial and geographical diversification of firms.
The ex-ante expectations of the effects of the Single market on the product structure of individual firms mostly relied on the hypothesis of "return to core business" Sembenelli, 2001a and 2001b) . Increased European competition involves the widening of competition to a European wide set of players in all industries which, if no strategic action taken, would lead to deterioration of the competitive position of the firm in all of its product-market combinations. The competitive threat spurs firms to reallocate resources into its core activities and related products, such that the firm's set of distinctive competencies becomes more focused towards these businesses in which they have excelled before. As a result the firm is likely to reduce the level of industrial diversification and, also stimulated by the reduced costs of doing business across national borders, to expand geographically.
Moreover, the wider European Single Market creates more possibilities to specialise and reduce the level of vertical integration in line with Adam's Smith adagio, "Specialisation is limited by the extent of the market". Firms will divest activities and opt for outsourcing those activities for which they find now suppliers offering better conditions within the EU. As a result industrial diversification across vertically related stages of production and distribution is expected to reduce along the market integration process.
Considering geographical diversification, further to the need to expand the core business across borders, increasing market integration makes it easier for firms to enter other EU Member States. The costs connected with entering the market of another Member State are comparatively low for established European firms. This gives rise to major cross-entries of markets within the EC (frequently through M&A).
This not only applies to established firms, but also to small or new firms that are no longer interested in penetrating a national market but wish to launch themselves on the single European market. The competitive pressure caused by firms entering the market is often reinforced by firms outside the EC. These firms fear that the completion of an internal market will inexorably lead to an increase in community protectionism. With these forces at work, the level of geographical diversification of EU as well as non-EU firms across Member States is expected to rise substantially.
Market integration also improves co-ordination possibilities for larger established firms and drives firms to better exploit scale and scope economies within Europe.
This improvement changes the configuration of firm activities, such that certain subactivities will become more geographically concentrated in some Member States. The geographical concentration process goes together with the development of more efficient logistics systems that is made possible by a further deregulation of the transportation and telecommunications sectors in Europe. Within Europe Vandermerwe (1993) discusses the formation of Euro-networks in view of the ongoing market reconfigurations on a European and global scale, with the structure and location of activities of firms no longer based on specific countries.
A recent UN Report (United Nations, 1993) identifies a similar shift in strategy of transnational firms (MNEs). As stand-alone strategies with multi-country structures become too costly due to duplications, transnational firms reorganise to a structure that allows a complex strategy. The restructuring leads to so-called new global and regional networks, where firms concentrate on their core activities and build close relationships with suppliers and distributors. In this process of organisational restructuring, the location of every part in the supply chain becomes a strategically important element. The way the development of such a network structure is expected to affect the geographical diversification of firms remains an empirical question.
Among other firms' characteristics, further analysis will provide a first assessment of the possible impact of market integration on the geographical diversification of large firms. &Lyons (1996) and for the time comparison 1987 -1993 -1997 in Veugelers (2001 .
Changes in industrial and
firm qualifies as a "leader" if it is one of the five largest EU producers in at least one manufacturing industry. For every such firm, the matrix includes estimates of its EU turnover in each industry in which it operates (not only in those where it is a "leader"), and dis-aggregates firm turnover, according to its production across industries and across production centres in EU member states. The MSM has been constructed for the years 1987, 1993, 1997.
The matrix built on these principles provides measures of industrial diversification and intra-EU geographical diversification of the Matrix firms.
Changes in diversification patterns over the decade 1987-1997
A comparison of the basic dimensions of the time comparable matrices 1987-1993-1997 provides a quick guide to the major changes in firm diversification over this period, as reported in countries. This number continuously increased over the period to an average of 4.5 countries in 1997. The percentage of total production occurring outside the home country has also increased: from on average 19% to 30%. Although this is a remarkable increase, it indicates that more than two thirds of total production is still produced in the home country. Thus, for the average EU firm, the location strategy seems to be still very much home country oriented, but geographical diversification across EU member states is strongly increasing. Non-EU firms were much more geographically diversified before market integration, and still increased the number of countries in which they are active. The larger diversification reflects the fact that most of these firms do not have a home basis in any of the European countries and have been typically more transnational before any market integration took place. Average % home country production EU firms 81% 76% 70% The second measure is part of the Entropy measure and looks at the share of output that the firm is producing in secondary industries outside its most important industry.
Changes in the distribution of diversification across firms
For geographical diversification, the output measure looks at the share of EU production outside the most important production country in the EU. For EU firms the most important country falls together with the home country where they are based. Looking through the indices in Table 2 , we find that highly diversified firms decreased diversification more substantially, although the trend is non-linear, with firms displaying first an increase and then a reduction in the mean values. At this level of aggregation, these preliminary findings are nonetheless suggestive of rationalisations that eliminated operations in unrelated or marginal industries.
A separate row in the table looks at firms that have survived in the matrix as leaders in at least one industry in the period 1987-1997. We expect that the increasing competitive pressure favoured less diversified firms more than high diversifiers.
Hence, we should find that survivors are either less diversified or refocusing over the period. Overall, the empirical findings are consistent with the return to the core hypothesis. The survivors (120 firms) display relatively high diversification, which they reduced by the end of the period, albeit marginally. Surviving firms also appear to be the largest in the sample. As to the diversification changes, the fact that the mean value of the output share in secondary industries is virtually unchanged with respect to 1987 for survivors suggests that de-diversification has mainly affected marginal, secondary activities.
Summarising the results for product diversification, the comparisons across indices allow us to partially confirm and better qualify the former preliminary results. Firms have readjusted their corporate structure around a lower number of industries, but
have not re-focussed the output share in their primary industries in any remarkable way. In other words, instead of a return to core business, we are documenting a return to core businesses. later. The biggest changes appear to have happened at the center of the distribution, shifting the distribution substantially over time. As to the output share in countries outside the base country, the largest shift occurs at the lower half of the distribution.
The combined findings for the two measures suggest that heavily diversified firms have increased diversification by spreading their activities more equally across borders, while the less diversified firms have increased diversification by investing more outside the base country.
Firms that survived in the matrix as leaders in at least one industry in the period 1987-1997 (120 firms) display relatively high geographical diversification, which they further increased by the end of the period, consistent with the overall shift in the distribution of all leading firms, including the entrance of new leaders after 1987.
Diversification in relation to characteristics of leading firms
Firm size
A stylised fact in the empirical literature on diversification is the positive correlation between industrial and geographical diversification and firm size (see, among the others, Davies and Lyons, 1996 , Davies, Rondi and Sembenelli, 2001a and 2001b , Sembenelli and Vannoni, 2000 , Vannoni 1999a ). The theoretical literature provides several motivations for this well documented evidence: scale and scope economies, intangible and proprietary assets, managerial hubris, risk diversification. 2 In particular, the resource theory of diversification argues that, in the growth process, firms accumulate resources which can be profitably employed to enter new markets, if transaction costs make it costly to sell the services of such resources through the market mechanism (Penrose, 1959 , Rubin, 1973 , Teece, 1980 and 1982 .
While the empirical literature suggest that both industrial and geographical diversification are basically different growth strategies of firms exploiting firm specific assets, their exact relationship -complements or substitutes-is still largely unexplored (but see Wolf, 1981, and Rondi, 2001b) . The evidence on the EU leaders diversification after 1993 suggests that both diversification strategies need not to go in the same direction. In section 4 we analyse this relationship at a somewhat deeper level.
In addition to common factors, some arguments point to a specific relationship between firm growth and either industrial or geographical diversification.
According to the agency view of diversification, managers pursue their own objectives (private benefits deriving from empire-building and risk diversification) in conflict with shareholders' interests for profit maximisation (Marris, 1964) , and overinvest in growth projects that reduce the firm's value (Jensen, 1986) . A side effect of the positive relationship between size and product diversification is that large corporations are most likely to exhibit a considerable amount of unrelated and industrially illogic diversification. Empirical and theoretical literatures converge in predicting that this "golf-course" diversification is eliminated as soon as competition in the core industry toughens. In table 3 we explore whether this prediction applies to EU leaders. period. Necessarily, therefore, the medium-large firms ranked 51 to 100 appear to have de-diversified more substantially than the largest top 50 firms.
Looking at the timing of the return to the core, we find an interesting pattern. Changes in the mean values display a monotonicity in de-diversification only for medium-large firms. In contrast with the ex-ante expectations of the effects of SMP, the largest firms increased diversification in the run-up to 1992, and appear to have responded to the increased competitive pressures only in most recent years. Firms outside the top 100 display a similar trend, but the motivations behind the lag in the response to increased competition may differ across size classes, and is clearly a matter for further research.
The link between the process of firm growth and the transnationalisation process has been examined in several studies. In combination with the evidence pointing at the importance of intangible assets, empirical research has shown that when firms grow in their home market, the opportunities on the national market shrink and firms are pushed or pulled into international markets (Horst (1972), Caves and Pugel (1980) ).
When firms decide to go abroad, they must incur a fixed cost of learning how things are done abroad. Moreover, establishing a subsidiary abroad implies a considerable sunk cost, which can better be incurred by large firms. Oligopolistic reaction theories also predict that larger firms in loose-knit oligopolistic industries are also likely to follow each other in expanding abroad (Knickerbocker, 1973) .
From table 3, it is clear that there is a strong difference in geographical diversification
between the top 100 firms and the firms outside this top 100, and this difference becomes even stronger over time. In 1987 top 100 firms were already much more internationally active than firms outside the top 100. From the entropy measure, the firms outside the top 100 increased their geographical diversification substantially more than the firms outside top 100 firms. The latter group of firms, however, showed a more marked increase in the output share in secondary countries. Again, this evidence is consistent with the finding that larger firms have rationalised production by spreading it more equally across EU member states while the smaller leaders have focused on catching up in the trans-nationalisation of production, be it in a less balanced structure as the one observed for larger firms. All in all, the evidence suggests for geographical diversification as well as for industrial diversification a tendency toward growing convergence in geographical production structure of leading EU firms over time.
Country of origin
Of the three most "industrial diversified countries" in 1987, UK, Germany and Italy, only German firms remains appreciably more diversified by 1997. Italy has undergone the largest decrease in the first sub-period, 1987-1993 (partly due to the privatisation of several subsidiaries of the state holdings IRI and ENI), whereas
British firms appear to have de-diversified more intensely between 1993 and 1997.
Firms originating in Germany, on average, exhibit a different pattern as they first increase diversification quite remarkably, and they then appear to refocus in the recent years. But the overall reduction, only reflected by the entropy index for diversification, is marginal. French firms were only moderately diversified in 1987, and they tend to remain so at the end of the period. Looking through the remaining countries reveals that the Netherlands and Sweden, with 8 and 6 leaders respectively in the 1997 matrix, are both characterised by high diversification, but the former displays an increase and the latter a decrease over the decade. The intra-EU operations by non-EU transnationals are on average quite less diversified than their European rivals, but as we do not account for their operations at home, nor in the rest of the world, we have only a partial view of the extent and trend of their diversification.
Contrary to European firms, they increased their level of industrial diversification within EU manufacturing.
Overall, although there is still evidence of systematic differences and country specificity, the changing pattern of industrial diversification by country shows some indication of convergence for EU firms. For 1993, Davies et al. (2001a) found that German firms were the very significant exception to the return to the core. In recent years, Germany appears to have inverted that trend. 
Industries applies to industrial diversification, countries to geographical diversification (**) Austria, Finland, Sweden, USA, Japan, Australia, Canada, Switzerland and Norway. Note: given the low number of diversified/transnational firms in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain, no entropy measure is presented for these countries.
Firms originating from smaller countries reach their limits to grow in the home market much faster than firms originating from larger countries, and thus it is natural that they show a higher level of geographical diversification. However one caveat when interpreting the empirical data is that, within the matrix, firms originating from smaller countries are likely to be underrepresented. Therefore, any inference on the average corporate structure for those countries is distorted by a selection bias. 
Industry type
In this section, we explore the influences of product market factors by grouping firms according to the nature of their primary industry. Table 5 In 1987, firms originating from differentiated product industries were more diversified than those originating from homogeneous product industries were. By 1997 Type 2 firms have re-focussed to the point that they are now much less diversified than Type 1 firms. This is not exactly what we would have expected, since firms in differentiated product industries are usually thought to enjoy more market power than firms in homogeneous industries, and therefore to be more "protected" from the toughening in competition due to the enlargement of the EU market. As it appears, the competitive escalation in R&D and advertising expenditure in the larger and more integrated market has led firms to divest from secondary industries and to concentrate their efforts to strengthen their position in the core business.
Within the differentiated group, firms originating in research intensive industries were, and remain, the most diversified, but they reduced their levels of diversification quite substantially (e.g. the output share in secondary industries dropped from 35% to 28%). The return to the core has been particularly intense between 1993 and 1997.
Advertising intensive firms and, to a lesser extent, 2AR firms started from lower levels of diversification, but they have also reduced their diversification, mostly in the first sub-period.
The theoretical literature predicts that research and advertising intensive firms tend to be more diversified because they have intangible assets (technological know-how, brand name, research or marketing skills) that can be used as public good and easily transferred to new (related) industries, or countries. Moreover, technological knowhow and research expertise (and much less so advertising and marketing skills), can be also profitably exploited through vertical integration, which is captured, but not separately identified, by our indices of diversification. The evidence of net dediversification we document in this section suggests that, in this period, the unlimited use of such intangible assets may have been ultimately restrained by the increasing competitive pressure within the EU, leading the firm to refocus on fewer industries where the price cost margins are higher, and to exit from marginal industries where a leading position cannot be obtained.
This interpretation is confirmed when we look at the de-diversification trend for industries classified according to their sensitivity to the Single Market Program. The removal of non-tariff barriers was expected to have a particularly strong effect on high-tech public procurement industries (such as computers, telecommunications, and medical instruments) and on a sub-set of traditional or regulated public procurement industries (such as pharmaceuticals, wires and cables, railways and shipbuilding, soft drinks and beer, pasta). In table 5 we find that diversification steadily reduced only in high tech industries, and much less so in traditional and regulated industries. Amongst industries where the removal of non-tariff barriers was expected to have a moderate effect, the reduction of diversification was also quite substantial. Finally, the remaining lot of non-sensitive industries displayed a weak tendency to reduce diversification.
Concerning geographical diversification, table 5 shows that, as expected from the intangible assets hypothesis, firms active in type 1 industries, i.e. homogenous goods industry, are less transnational than firms active in type 2 industries. However, while firms of all types increased their geographical diversification over time, the increase in output produced in secondary countries was most significant in type 1 industries, indicating that the relevant market for these firms has become EU-wide, with a real need to expand operations European wide. Within type 2 industries, the firms competing jointly on the basis of R&D and advertising show a higher level of geographical diversification, and still continued to expand strongly after 1987. In contrast to Type I homogeneous industries, production is more equally spread across In this section we extend our analysis by considering industrial diversification jointly with geographical diversification as growth strategies available to the firm 3 . In particular, using very simple statistical tools, we ask whether industrial diversification and geographical diversification have been alternative routes to EU leaders growthi.e. complements or substitutes.
We start by comparing, for 1987 and 1997, the simple count of firms which are both industrially and geographically diversified against those who choose only one option (see table 6 ). The first things we note is that both industrial and geographical diversification have become increasingly important to achieve the status of an EU leader in this period. The number of firms that were uninational and specialised has halved, and the number of firms both transnational and industrially diversified has increased by almost 20%. The two groups represent 6.7% and 68% of the firm total in 1997, thus suggesting complementarity. Interestingly, however, while the number of uninational firms that are only diversified at home dropped from 47 to 18, the number of specialised transnationals increased from 19 to 38. This, in turn, suggests that the diversification route to growth, especially when confined to the domestic market has lost appeal amongst EU leaders. Finally, the rows and columns totals of these matrices show that industrial diversification was more frequent in 1987 (175 versus 147), but that the opposite is true in 1997 (170 versus 190). Interestingly, however, the EU surviving leaders exhibit a strong positive correlation between output growth and diversification growth (0.41). The correlation between firm growth and growth in geographical diversification is also positive, although it is perhaps somewhat lower than we expected (0.22). In contrast with the findings for the full sample of firms (Table 6) , which suggested substitutability between the two strategies, surviving leaders appear to have pursued both industrial and geographical diversification as routes to growth. And the correlation between changes in both types of diversification, is positively signed, albeit very low (0.05). Some indication of substitutability comes from the correlation between the levels of geographical diversification and the growth of industrial diversification which is negative (-0.19),
suggesting that firms that were most geographically diversified in 1987 showed a tendency to reduce industrial diversification over the 1987-1997 period. The reverse is not true, however, as the correlation between the levels of industrial diversification and the growth of geographical diversification is (weakly) positive (0.10). Comparisons of the mean values across the quartiles show that the least industrially diversified firms are those who most increased their size and their diversification over the period, but less increased geographical diversification. In contrast, the top industrially diversified firms have grown less rapidly, but appear to have rationalised most their corporate structures, as they display the higher rate of geographical diversification and the higher rate of industrial de-diversification. Taken together, this multi-faceted evidence suggests that substitutability between industrial and geographical diversification as routes to corporate growth may be more present than accounted for by the previous findings. This is clearly an issue for future research. 
Conclusions
This section has explored the diversification strategies of EU leaders. Its main purpose was to verify if, following the ex-ante expectations of the impact of the SMP as well as a variety of theoretical explanations, "return to the core" and geographical concentration in production had occurred over the decade 1987-1997.
We find indication of a tendency for firms to refocus towards the leading business.
Although diversification is decreasing on average, firms who are either very large or very diversified appear to reduce their initial levels of diversification more than smaller or less diversified firms do. In a similar vein, we find also evidence of convergence of corporate structures across EU member states. Countries that in 1987
were hosting the most industrially diversified leaders, such as Germany, the UK, Italy and Sweden, have undergone a considerable reduction in diversified operations. Since the Entropy index of industrial diversification appears to contract more than the output share in secondary industries, this suggests that firms' operation in marginal industries have reduced more than proportionally. Consistent with this pattern, we find those firms able to survive as matrix leaders display relatively high industrial diversification, but they tend to reduce it by 1997.
At the same time firms have increasingly expanded and/or rebalanced their geographical operations across Member States, thereby strongly increasing their geographical diversification of production over time. Especially French firms have substantially increased the geographical scope of their operations within the EU.
The SMP was expected to impact asymmetrically across industries. In particular, firms in the sectors defined most sensitive to EU integration were expected to react more intensively. Our analysis confirms this for industrial diversification. Among the SMP sensitive industries, leading firms in high-tech industries characterised by a high percentage of public procurement, strongly reduced their industrial diversification, while at the same time, they strongly increased their geographical diversification. Moreover, separating firms by type of product (homogeneous or differentiated), we find that industrial diversification in industries where either advertising or R&D expenditures are important strategic weapons reduced quite remarkably. This suggests that in these very sectors the competitive pressure has induced firms to refocus towards the core business and to abandon non-leading activities. Firms in homogenous industries expanded strongly outside their base country, albeit in a less balanced way as we could observe for differentiated industries.
The last issue we investigate is the potential complementarity/substitutability relationship between geographical and industrial diversification as possible routes to growth. The results highlight that the number of firms which are both industrially and geographically diversified increased (suggesting complementarity), but also that geographical diversification has become the preferred route to growth as compared to industrial diversification (suggesting substitutability). Further evidence comes from the sub-sample of surviving leaders, for which we report a positive correlation between growth in industrial and geographical diversification. However, within this sub-sample, firms who were most diversified in 1987 have reduced industrial diversification by 25% and increased geographical diversification by 65% over the period. Again, this provides some indication of substitutability.
The above patterns are not linear through time. While industrial diversification for some groupings appears to be still on the rise between 1987 and 1993, it is in the last sub-period that we find more evidence of the return to the core. This is an intriguing result, since the completion of the Single European Market was expected to lead firms to reorganise their corporate structures by 1992. The lag in the firms' responses to the EU wide shock suggests that return to the core may still be in progress in the years afters 1997, and that the process of European market integration shows no sign of slowing down.
Contrary to some ex-ante theories of the impact of market integration on the geographical diversification of firms, this section provides no evidence for a decrease in the level of geographical diversification by leading firms in the EU over the period 1987-1997. On the contrary, both the number of transnational firms and the level of geographical diversification of the average firm have continuously increased over that period, irrespective of the country of origin or industrial sector. The latter evidence, together with a growing convergence in industrial diversification and geographical diversification of leading firms in European manufacturing industries strongly suggest that the relevant market on which firm compete has become increasingly European wide.
